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CASE COMMENTS
Constitutional Law-FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT-REQUIREMENT OF
FILING FEE FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE REDUCTION OF
WELFARE BENEFITS DOES NOT CONSTITUTE DENIAL OF DUE PROCESS
OR EQUAL PROTECTION OF LAw.-Ortwein v. Schwab, 410 U.S. 656
(1973).
Raymond Ortwein and Gwendolyn Faubion appeared before the
Oregon Public Welfare Division in separate, unrelated proceedings
to contest administrative actions that had resulted in reduction of
their welfare payments., After hearings, the Division denied relief. As
authorized by Oregon law, 2 each then sought judicial review by the
Oregon Court of Appeals. Both Ortwein and Faubion moved to pro-
ceed in forma pauperis, alleging indigency and inability to pay the 25-
dollar filing fee required of all civil appellants in Oregon appellate
hearing, and counsel was not provided, the sentence was vacated but the revocation
remained valid. See, e.g., Bryant v. State, 194 So. 2d 21 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1967);
Phillips v. State, 165 So. 2d 246 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1964). The invalidation of the
sentence was based on the premise that sentencing, unlike the hearing itself, was a
"critical stage" that required the presence of appointed counsel. After Mempa, the
courts ruled that absence of counsel at a combined revocation and sentencing hearing
rendered the entire procedure invalid. See, e.g., Herrington v. State, 207 So. 2d 323 (Fla.
2d Dist. Ct. App. 1968). At least one court read Mempa even more broadly and held
that the revocation of probation was a "critical stage" requiring the appointment of
counsel at all revocation hearings, regardless of the particular facts. See Gargan v. State,
217 So. 2d 578 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1969). No Florida court had reached the Gagnon
conclusion requiring a case-by-case approach to the appointment decision.
Further, no Florida court has held that due process requires appointed counsel at
a parole revocation hearing. Prior to Mempa, when Florida courts denied probationers
a right to counsel, parolees were similarly denied appointed counsel on the ground
that probation revocation hearings "are sufficiently analogous to a parole revocation
proceeding so as to warrant application of the same rule." Shiplett v. Wainwright,
198 So. 2d 647, 648 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1967); accord, Johnson v. Wainwright, 208
So. 2d 505 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1968). After Mempa, when some courts invoked that
decision to require appointment at probation revocation proceedings, the court that
had previously found the two proceedings analogous again refused to extend a right
of appointed counsel to parolees. See Moore v. Wainwright, 253 So. 2d 736 (Fla. 1st
Dist. Ct. App. 1971). After Gagnon, however, it is evident that probationers and parolees
must be treated alike with respect to appointment of counsel and satisfaction of due
process.
1. Raymond Ortwein sustained a reduction in his Oregon old-age assistance when his
county welfare agency determined that his sharing of expenses and shelter with another
person relieved him of some of the costs upon which his initial award had been
based. Gwendolyn Faubion was involved in a work-training program and claimed that
certain work-related expenses should be deducted from her gross income in computing
her income for purposes of AFDC payments. The deductions were denied, raising her
computed income and therefore resulting in lower AFDC payments. Ortwein v. Schwab,
410 U.S. 656, 656-58 & nn.1 & 2 (1973).
2. ORE. REV. STAT. § 183.480 (1971). The statute provides for judicial review of agency
proceedings and confers jurisdiction on the Oregon Court of Appeals,
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courts.3 The Oregon Court of Appeals denied their motions without
opinion.4 Ortwein and Faubion then petitioned the Oregon Supreme
Court for writs of mandamus ordering the Court of Appeals to accept
their cases without payment of the fees. The Oregon Supreme Court
rejected the petitioners' fourteenth amendment arguments and denied
the petitions.5 On appeal, the United States Supreme Court affirmed,
per curiam, holding that Oregon's filing fee requirement did not
violate appellants' fourteenth amendment rights of due process and
equal protection. 6
Appellants relied upon Boddie v. Connecticut7 in formulating
their due process argument, but the Court distinguished Boddie and
held that United States v. Kras8 governed its decision.9 Both Boddie
3. See Oa. REV. STAT. § 21.010 (1971). The statute applies to civil appeals to the
Oregon Supreme Court and Court of Appeals.
4. The decision of the court of appeals is not reported. The disposition of the case
is stated in Ortwein v. Schwab, 410 U.S. 656, 658 (1973).
5. Ortwein v. Schwab, 498 P.2d 757 (Ore. 1972). This case was styled an original
mandamus action, which would also require the payment of a $25 filing fee. See ORE.
REV. STAT. § 21.040 (1971).
Petitioners alleged that the filing-fee statutes were invalid as contrary to the first
and fourteenth amendments. Their first amendment allegation was that the filing fees
operated to deny indigent appellants the right to petition the government for redress
of grievances. The court summarily dismissed this contention as irrelevant. 498 P.2d at
759.
Relying on Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971), petitioners next alleged that
requiring filing fees of indigent petitioners denied them their fourteenth amendment
rights of due process by operating to deprive them of access to the courts. The court
distinguished Boddie on the ground that it involved dissolution of marriage, which
can only be granted by a court, whereas the right to welfare benefits could be, and
was, determined by a hearing before the welfare division. 498 P.2d at 760. The court
noted its prior decisions holding that there was no right to judicial review of adminis-
trative hearings and concluded that petitioners had suffered no denial of due process. Id.
Petitioners' final contention was that the equal protection rationale of Griffin v.
Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956), should be applied to invalidate the statutes. The court
rejected this plea, stating that the right to judicial review was "not such a 'fundamental
personal right' that it is in violation of the Equal Protection Clause to make such
right dependent upon the ability to pay a $25 filing fee." 498 P.2d at 761.
6. Ortwein v. Schwab, 410 U.S. 656 (1973).
7. 401 U.S. 371 (1971). Appellants also relied upon Frederick v. Schwartz, 402 U.S. 937
(1971), a case essentially identical to Ortwein. There, prior to the Supreme Court's
decision in Boddie, the district court had held that the fee requirement as applied to
welfare recipients was not violative of due process or equal protection. Frederick v.
Schwartz, 296 F. Supp. 1321 (D. Conn. 1969). On appeal, the Supreme Court vacated
and remanded for reconsideration in light of Boddie. In Ortwein the Court disposed of
Frederick by emphasizing that it "was remanded, and not summarily reversed." 410
U.S. at 659.
8. 409 U.S. 434 (1973).
9. 410 U.S. at 659.
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and Kras, however, were essential to the constitutional analysis under-
taken by the Ortwein Court. 10
In Boddie, the Court had held that the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment "prohibit[s] a State from denying, solely be-
cause of inability to pay, access to its courts to individuals who seek
judicial dissolution of their marriages."'1 Writing for the majority,
Justice Harlan emphasized two factors in reaching this conclusion:
first, the Court has long recognized the institution of marriage as "in-
volv[ing] interests of basic importance in our society"12; secondly, since
the only avenue to dissolution of marriage is through the state courts,
the state has monopolized the means for dissolving this relationship. 13
Justice Harlan concluded that the state's refusal to admit to its courts
indigent welfare recipients seeking a dissolution of marriage "must
be regarded as the equivalent of denying them an opportunity to be
heard upon their claimed right ... and, in the absence of a sufficient
countervailing justification for the State's action, a denial of due pro-
cess." ' 4 The concurring Justices in Boddie were critical of the majority's
sole reliance on the due process clause,' 5 asserting that a better basis'
10. For a summary of the evolution and pre-Boddie status of the rights of in-
digents of access to the courts, see Note, Litigation Costs: The Hidden Barrier to the
Indigent, 56 GEO. L.J. 516 (1968).
11. 401 U.S. at 374.
12. Id. at 376.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 380-81. Boddie has most frequently been cited for the proposition
that due process requires that an individual be given an opportunity to be heard before
he is deprived of any significant property interest. See, e.g., Getty Oil Co. v. Ruckleshaus,
467 F.2d 349, 356 (3d Cir. 1972); Lucas v. Wisconsin Electric Power Co., 466 F.2d 638,
671 (7th Cir. 1972).
For a report of the tactics employed by the Boddie appellants, see LaFrance, Constitu-
tional Law Reform for the Poor: Boddie v. Connecticut, 1971 DUKE L.J. 487. Professor
LaFrance, counsel for the appellants, discusses the use of the case as a vehicle for reform.
In his view, "Justice Harlan's limitation on Boddie cannot last. It may have been a
legitimate recognition of the limited facts in Boddie, but it will not bear application
elsewhere." Id. at 536. Professor LaFrance was by no means alone in the view that
the application of Boddie should be extended beyond the very narrow factual situation.
"[G]radual expansion of the scope of Boddie's protection for the indigent litigant can
be achieved only by an erosion of the two primary limiting criteria in that case: the
requirement of a state monopoly over the subject matter of the desired litigation and
the specific financial barriers that the case involved." Note, Indigent Access to Civil
Courts: The Tiger Is at the Gates, 26 VAND. L. REv. 25, 43 (1973). "The basic premise
of this article is that the holding of Boddie should be expanded to guarantee the waiver
of court costs and filing fees in all civil litigation .... " Comment, Boddie v. Connecticut
and the Constitutional Rights of Indigents, 45 TEMP. L.Q. 390, 391-92 (1972). "If the
logic of the Boddie decision is carried to its ultimate conclusion it seems inescapable
that eventually indigent litigants will be supplied . . . cost free access to all determinative
tribunals ... in most types of civil litigation." Comment, Boddie v. Connecticut: Whither
the Indigent Civil Litigant, 22 CATI. U.L. REV. 427, 439 (1973).
15. Justice Douglas was extremely critical of the majority's reliance upon due
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for the decision was the equal protection clause as applied in Griffin
v. Illinois6 and the subsequent line of cases involving the right of
access to the courts.
The first attempts to extend Boddie came in the area of bank-
ruptcy.17 Litigants contended that Boddie should be extended to grant
indigent petitioners the right to proceed in bankruptcy without filing
the required 50-dollar fee."' In In re Garland,19 decided while Boddie
was pending before the Court, the First Circuit had held that a dis-
charge in bankruptcy is not a fundamental right and that the due
process clause does not preclude Congress from conditioning such a
process and would have based the decision on the equal protection rationale of Griffin
v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956), discussed at note 16 infra. In his view the case involved
"[a]n invidious discrimination based on poverty." 401 U.S. at 386. His specific criticism
of the use of due process was that such a rationale lends itself to a subjective deter-
mination by individual judges and is reminiscent of the Court's prior decisions in which
substantive due process was used to invalidate state statutes that the individual mem-
bers of the Court felt were unwise. 401 U.S. at 383-86 (Douglas, J., concurring).
Justice Brennan would have based the decision on the due process clause, but without
consideration of the state monopoly factor. In his view the equal protection rationale
of Griffin was also applicable and appellants had been denied equal protection. 401 U.S.
at 386-89 (Brennan, J., concurring).
Justice Black, the lone dissenter, expressed the view that the majority's due process
analysis was in reality a "shock the conscience" test that allows the Court to determine
constitutionality by a standard of fairness set by a judge's personal views. In his view,
Griffin was properly restricted to the criminal area and neither the equal protection
clause nor the due process clause required access to the courts. 401 U.S. at 389-94 (Black,
J., dissenting).
16. 351 U.S. 12 (1956). The issue in Griffin was whether the state must supply an
indigent criminal appellant with a free transcript of the record of his trial court
proceeding. Petitioners had alleged that the state's failure to provide indigents with a
free transcript operated to deny them adequate appellate review and thus constituted
a violation of their fourteenth amendment rights of due process and equal protection.
After acknowledging that a state is not constitutionally required to provide an appellate
system, the Court stated that a state that does grant appellate review cannot do so "in
a way that discriminates against some convicted defendants on account of their poverty."
Id. at 18. The Court then observed that "[t]here can be no equal justice where the
kind of trial a man gets depends on the amount of money he has. Destitute defendants
must be afforded as adequate appellate review as defendants who have money enough
to buy transcripts." Id. at 19. Accord, Roberts v. LaVallee, 389 U.S. 40 (1967) (free
transcript of preliminary hearing in criminal proceeding); Draper v. Washington, 372
U.S. 487 (1963) (procedure by which decision was made to grant free transcript operat-
ed to deny petitioners the rights assured by Griffin); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353
(1963) (right to counsel of indigent criminal appellant).
17. See, e.g., In re Garland, 428 F.2d 1185 (1st Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 966
(1971); In re Smith, 341 F. Supp. 1297 (N.D. Ill. 1972); In re Ottman, 336 F. Supp. 746
(E.D. Wis. 1972); In re Naron, 334 F. Supp. 1150 (D. Ore. 1971); In re Smith, 323 F.
Supp. 1082 (D. Colo. 1971).
18. A total of $50 in fees is required to file a petition for bankruptcy. See 11 U.S.C.
§§ 32(b)(2), 68(c)(1), 76(c), 80(a) (1970).
19. 428 F.2d 1185 (1st Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 966 (1971).
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discharge on the prepayment of a filing fee.2 0 After Boddie was decided,
petition for certiorari in Garland was denied by the Court, as was a
petition from one other decision upholding the application of filing
fees to indigent civil litigants1.2
The first explication of Boddie came in United States v. Kras.2 1
There the district court had held, contrary to the First Circuit's decision
in In re Garland, that the fee requirement in a bankruptcy proceeding
was an unconstitutional denial of the indigent petitioner's fifth amend-
ment rights of due process and equal protection.2 3 The district court
relied primarily on Boddie and granted the petitioner leave to file and
proceed without the filing of fees. On direct appeal, 24 the Supreme
Court reversed, refusing to extend Boddie to bankruptcy proceed-
ings.2 5 In distinguishing Boddie, the majority emphasized two factors
as basic to that decision: "state monopolization of the means for
legally dissolving marriage"26 and the "fundamental importance" of
the marital relationship under the constitution.2 7 Applying these factors
to Kras, the Court reasoned that "no fundamental interest" was in-
volved28 and that "Boddie's emphasis on exclusivity finds no counter-
part in the bankrupt's situation." 29 The interest in a discharge in
bankruptcy was found not to "rise to the same constitutional level"
as the interest in a dissolution of marriage.30 The monopolization
20. Id.
21. Borbeau v. Lancaster, 402 U.S. 964 (1971). In two other cases involving such
filing fees the Court vacated and remanded for reconsideration in light of Boddie. See
Sloatman v. Gibbons, 402 U.S. 939 (1971), vacating 454 P.2d 574 (Ariz. 1969); Frederick
v. Schwartz, 402 U.S. 937 (1971), vacating 296 F. Supp. 1321 (D. Conn. 1969).
22. 409 U.S. 434 (1973).
23. In re Kras, 331 F. Supp. 1207 (E.D.N.Y. 1971). For discussions of Boddie as applied
by the district court in Kras, see Comment, Boddie and Beyond: Rights of the Indigent
Civil Litigant, 18 CATHOLIC LAW. 67 (1972); 60 GEO. L.J. 1581 (1972); 18 WAYNE L. REV.
1431 (1972). Although the fifth amendment does not include an equal protection
clause, the Court consistently applies the same analysis to equal protection challenges
brought under the due process clause of the fifth amendment as it applies to those
brought under the equal protection clause of the fourteenth. See Frontiero v. Richardson,
411 U.S. 667 (1973); Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954); Faruki v. Rogers, 349 F. Supp.
723 (D.D.C. 1972).
24. The government appealed directly to the Supreme Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1252 (1970).
25. 409 U.S. 434 (1973). For a discussion of the Supreme Court decision, see Note,
United States v. Kras: Justice at a Price, 40 BROOKLYN L. REv. 147 (1973); Comment,
Constitutional Law-The Indigent and Access to the Civil Courts, 52 N.C.L. REV. 172
(1973).
26. 409 U.S. at 441.
27. Id. at 444.
28. Id. at 445.
29. Id. at 446.
30. Id. at 445.
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factor was not present because, in theory, Kras personally could
negotiate a settlement of his debts with his creditors.31 Thus, the Kras
Court found no denial of due process in the state's conditioning a
bankrupt's access to the courts on the payment of filing fees.
After finding no due process violation, the Kras Court went on to
hold that neither was there a denial of equal protection.3 2 Since the
interest involved was not fundamental and did not involve a suspect
classification, it fell within the area of economic and social welfare.
33
Therefore, the "rational justification" and not the "compelling in-
terest" test applied.3 4 The rational justification test was satisfied by
the Court's finding that filing fees were a rational means of making
the bankruptcy system self-sustaining and supported by its users rather
than by taxpayers at large.'-
The basis for the Boddie decision clearly emerges from Kras as
a two-prong test for assessing the constitutionality of statutes regulating
access to the judicial process. First, the interest at issue must be constitu-
tionally "fundamental." Secondly, resolution of the dispute involving
this interest must be monopolized by the state in its courts. If these
two requirements are met, Boddie would seem to compel a finding
that due process has been violated when access has been denied and
there is no countervailing justification for the state's action.
The issues in Ortwein, as framed by the Kras Court's reading of
Boddie, were (1) whether the right to welfare benefits is constitutional-
ly fundamental and (2) whether the resolution of disputes involving
these benefits was monopolized by the state in its courts.
The Court disposed of the first issue by stating that the inter-
31. Id.
32. Id. at 446.
33. Id. The Court referred to Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970), holding
that state regulation of welfare benefits falls within the social and economic area, to
which the "rational justification" test applies. See 397 U.S. at 484-86.
34. 409 U.S. at 446. Under the "rational justification" or "rational basis" test, the
state need only show that its challenged legislation rationally effectuates a legitimate
goal. See, e.g., Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57 (1961); Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464
(1948). But where state legislation appears to discriminate on the basis of a "suspect"
criterion-such as race-or impedes the unfettered enjoyment of a "fundamental" interest
-such as the right to vote-that legislation must withstand the "strict scrutiny" of the
"compelling state interest" test. Under this standard the state must offer some "com-
pelling" reason for its discriminatory legislation and must show that its desired objective
cannot be attained in any alternative manner. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S.
618 (1969); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966); Griswold v. Con-
necticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). For a general discussion of this traditional equal protec-
tion analysis, see Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Foreword: In Search of
Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86
HAsv. L. Rr-v. 1 (1972).
35. 409 U.S. at 448.
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est involved, "like that of Kras, has far less constitutional significance
than the interest of the Boddie appellants."38 Therefore, as in Kras,
there was " 'no fundamental interest that [was] gained or lost depending
on the availability' of the relief sought by appellants." 37 As to monopoli-
zation, the Court found that the agency hearings were an adequate
alternative to the courts as a means of dispute resolution.38 Since ap-
pellants had no constitutional right to a free appeal,3 9 and since pro-
cedural due process was amply afforded by the prereduction welfare
agency hearing,40 the Court held that there was no violation of due
process.'
Appellants' equal protection argument was summarily disposed of
by the same rationale applied in Kras. The Court found that since liti-
gation dealing with welfare payments relates to economic and social
welfare, and since this litigation involved no suspect classification, the
applicable standard was that of rational justification.42 The test was
satisfied by the state's interest in partially offsetting court costs, ac-
complished by the use of reasonable filing fees.43
There are two basic criticisms of the Boddie test as it has been
applied. First, the restrictive application of the test has resulted in
factual distinctions that are more theoretical than real.44 Second, the
36. 410 U.S. at 659.
37. Id., quoting from United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434, 445 (1972).
38. 410 U.S. at 659-60.
39. Id. at 660. "This Court has long recognized that even in criminal cases, due
process does not require a State to provide an appellate system." Id.
40. Id. at 659. The Court noted that Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970), re-
quired that welfare recipients be given a pretermination evidentiary hearing, which
must meet the minimal requirements of due process. 410 U.S. at 659 n.4. The Ortwein
appellants alleged that their hearing before the division did not meet this requirement
but the Court did not discuss this issue, stating that "neither the record nor the
opinion of the Oregon court provides support for these contentions." Id.
41. 410 U.S. at 660.
42. Id.
43. Id. The appellants also alleged that they had "capriciously and arbitrarily"
been denied an appeal in violation of the equal protection clause, relying on Lindsey
v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972). See 410 U.S. at 661. In Lindsey the Court had stated that
"[w]hen an appeal is afforded ... it cannot be granted to some litigants and capricious-
ly or arbitrarily denied to others without violating the Equal Protection Clause." 405
U.S. at 77. The Court was referring to the double-bond requirement for appeal of an
adverse decision in a proceeding pursuant to Oregon's forcible entry and wrongful
detainer statute. Appellants in Ortwein contended that since Oregon does not require the
filing fee in certain habeas corpus proceedings, in appeals from termination of parental
rights and in criminal appeals, the denial of this right to indigent welfare recipients was
arbitrary and capricious. The Court dismissed this issue with the statement that "we
cannot say that this categorization is capricious or arbitrary." 410 U.S. at 661.
44. Justices Stewart and Marshall, dissenting in Kras, both took the view that the
majority had failed to distinguish Kras from Boddie. 409 U.S. 434, 451-63 (1973). Justices
Brennan, Douglas and Marshall, dissenting in Ortwein, took the same view of the ma-
jority's distinction between Ortwein and Boddie. 410 U.S. 656, 663-65 (1973).
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doctrinal basis for the test was framed so narrowly as to be no test
at all, but rather an ad hoc determination of little value as future
precedent.45 Distilled further, these criticisms call into question the
basic issue of whether the dual-factor "fundamental interest" and
"monopolization" analysis provides any realistic justification for the
judicial denial or granting of free access to the courts.
The fundamental interest factor can be no more than a "highly
subjective" determination that is "dependent on the idiosyncrasies of
individual judges."4 6 This has resulted in the determination that the
interest in dissolution of marriage is fundamental while the interests
in discharge in bankruptcy and welfare benefits are not. Although
a distinction between Boddie and Kras may be drawn on the basis that
there is no constitutional right to a discharge in bankruptcy,4 7 the
crucial importance of welfare benefits, recognized by the Court in
Goldberg v. Kelly,4s would seem to establish the interest of welfare
recipients as fundamental in any realistic sense of the word.
The Court's distinction between the state's monopolization of dis-
solution of marriage and discharge in bankruptcy or determination
of welfare benefits seems conceptually, but not realistically, sound.
Theoretically, divorce is easily distinguished from disputes involving
bankruptcy and welfare benefits; only when a divorce is contemplated
are the parties required by the state to seek judicial resolution of their
dispute. While Ortwein and Kras were theoretically free to settle their
disputes without resort to the courts,' 9 in reality a bankrupt may have
little hope of achieving a nonjudicial resolution of his dilemma °5 0 and
45. See Meltzer v. C. Buck LeCraw & Co., 402 U.S. 954, 954-60 (1972) (Black, J., dis-
senting from denial of certiorari); Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 383-85 (Douglas,
J., concurring), 389-94 (Black, J., dissenting) (1971).
46. 401 U.S. at 385 (Douglas, J., concurring).
47. This point was emphasized by the Court in Kras. 409 U.S. at 446. This analysis
seems to indicate a return to the "right-privilege" dichotomy that was rejected by the
Court in Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 404 (1963) (to the effect that constitutionality
does not depend on whether the interest involved is a right or a privilege). Accord,
Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
48. 397 U.S. 254, 264-65 (1969). The Court recognized that the importance of wel-
fare benefits to recipients required a pretermination evidentiary hearing in order to
satisfy due process requirements.
49. In Kras, the Court expressed the view that, in theory, a debtor "may adjust his
debts by negotiated agreement with his creditors," the statute of limitations may run
or some other "acceptable creditor arrangement" will provide the debtor with an
answer to his problems. 409 U.S. at 445. In Ortwein the petitioners had the right to
administrative review of their dispute.
50. The weakness of the majority's contention was pointed out by Justice Stewart
in Kras:
[T]he assetless bankrupt has absolutely nothing to offer his creditors. And his
creditors have nothing to gain by allowing him to escape or reduce his debts; their
[Vol. 2
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a welfare recipient has no judicial alternative to reduction in benefits
except acquiescence to that reduction.?'
The monopolization factor, therefore, rests not on the reality
that the state often may possess the only practical means of resolving
a dispute, but on the theory that in only a few disputes-such as di-
vorce-has the state imposed the monopoly by requiring that the dis-
pute be resolved in the state's courts.
That the doctrinal basis for the Boddie test was deliberately placed
on narrow grounds is implicitly demonstrated by the refusal of a
majority of the Court to base the Kras and Ortwein decisions on either
of two alternate grounds that, prior to Boddie, seemed to have been
viable. Instead of characterizing the specific human interests involved
in divorce as fundamental, the Boddie Court might have based its de-
cision on the constitutional significance of the broader interest of
access to the courts.5 2 Prior to Boddie it seemed arguable that access
only hope is that eventually he might make enough income for them to attach.
Unless the government provides him access to the bankruptcy court, Kras will
remain in the totally hopeless situation he now finds himself. The government
has thus truly pre-empted the only means for the indigent bankrupt to get out
from under a lifetime burden of debt.
409 U.S. at 455-56 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (footnotes omitted). In Justice Stewart's
view, Boddie turned on the fact that the monopolization factor was coupled with "the
existence of judicially enforced obligations." Id. at 456 n.7. Thus, in view of the fact that
"[t]he bankrupt is bankrupt precisely for the reason that the State stands ready to
exact all of his debts through garnishment, attachment, and the panoply of other credi-
tor remedies," Kras and the Boddie litigants were equally left with no alternative save
judicial resolution of their disputes. Id. at 455. Justice Marshall agreed with Justice
Stewart's comments regarding the majority's view of the alternatives open to Kras for
resolution of his dispute. See 409 U.S. at 458-63 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
51. Once an indigent welfare recipient's right to welfare benefits has been determined
by the public welfare division, he must either acquiesce in that determination or seek
judicial review. If, as the Ortwein Court decided sub silentio, there is no due process
right to judicial review of an administrative decision, then the recipient either accepts
what the division awards or rejects all benefits; he has no other alternative. The majority
in Ortwein framed the issue as the right to an appeal and disposed of it by noting that
even in criminal cases the Court has long recognized that due process does not require
a state to provide an appellate system. 410 U.S. at 660. However, Justices Douglas and
Marshall noted that in Ortwein the petitioners were seeking initial access to the
courts, and that the issue of whether there is a right to judicial review of administrative
decisions is one that has not before been decided by the Court. 410 U.S. at 661-62
(Douglas, J., dissenting), 665-66 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
52. Justice Marshall, in Kras, adopted this position:
I view the case as involving the right of access to the courts, the opportunity to
be heard when one claims a legal right, and not just the right to a discharge in
bankruptcy. When a person raises a claim of right or entitlement under the laws,
the only forum in our legal system empowered to determine that claim is a
court.
409 U.S. at 462 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (footnotes omitted). Justice Douglas expressed
the same view in Ortwein. 410 U.S. at 662 (Douglas, J., dissenting). Justice Black, who had
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to the courts, like the constitutionally protected right to vote, could
not be abridged because of poverty. 5 Refraining from consideration
of this broader issue, however, the Court chose to limit Boddie, Kras
and Ortwein to the question of whether a right of access to the courts
existed within the context of the particular factual situations present-
ed. By conditioning free access on the presence of the two Boddie
factors, the Court implicitly rejected the existence of a broad and in-
dependent fundamental right of access to the courts.
Alternatively, the Court might have invoked the equal protection
analysis relied upon in Griffin v. Illinois.5 4 There, the Court held that
once a state has established a system for appellate review of criminal
prosecutions, the equal protection clause prohibits denial of access
to that system based on poverty.55 At first glance it would appear that
Griffin and its line of cases logically should have been extended to the
Boddie factual situation.5 6 In each of those cases criminal appellants
were denied an opportunity for adequate review because of their in-
ability to pay certain fees.5 7 However, the majority in Boddie avoided
the equal protection question by relying solely on a due process in-
quiry. In both Kras and Ortwein the Court did address the issue but
found no violation of equal protection.
dissented in Boddie, expressed the following view in Meltzer v. C. Buck LeCraw & Co., 402
U.S. 954 (1971):
In my view, the decision in Boddie v. Connecticut can safely rest on only one
crucial foundation-that the civil courts of the United States and each of the
States belong to the people of this country and that no person can be denied
access to those courts, either for a trial or an appeal, because he cannot pay a
fee, finance a bond, risk a penalty, or afford to hire an attorney.
Id. at 955-56 (Black, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
53. See In re Smith, 323 F. Supp. 1082 (D. Colo. 1971), where the court held that
indigents seeking bankruptcy must be granted access to the courts without paying
filing fees because access to the courts is, aside from bankruptcy, a fundamental interest
which is protected by the equal protection aspect of the fifth amendment and should
not be abridged by a filing fee requirement. There the court analogized the right of
access to the courts to the right to vote, stating that voting is a fundamental right "which,
once granted, may not be conditioned upon wealth." Id. at 1086. The court was relying
upon Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966), which held that Virginia's
poll tax, conditioning the right to vote upon payment of a fee, violated the equal protec-
tion clause.
It seems arguable that access to the courts, like the constitutionally protected right
to vote, is a "fundamental political right, because preservative of all rights." Yick Wo
v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886). "It is surely arguable that access is as important to
the establishment and maintenance of a legitimate political system as the right to
vote. . . . Just as the equal protection clause prohibits conditioning the right to vote on
wealth, it should also prohibit the use of wealth to control access to the courts." Abram,
Access to the Judicial Process, 6 GA. L. REV. 247, 259 (1972).
54. 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
55. Id.
56. See note 15 and accompanying text supra.
57. See note 16 supra.
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CASE COMMENTS
The most obvious rationale for confining the Griffin equal protec-
tion analysis to the criminal area was stated by Justice Black in his
dissent in Boddie:55 Only in criminal proceedings are great govern-
mental powers brought to bear upon the individual, and, therefore,
the individual deserves very strict constitutional protection from this
power. 9 This distinction between criminal and civil proceedings finds
support in the text of the Griffin opinion: "In criminal trials a State
can no more discriminate on account of poverty than on account of
religion, race, or color." 60 While this distinction rationally may apply
to Boddie and Kras, it does not seem applicable to civil cases such as
Ortwein where governmental power seeks to deprive the individual of
valuable interests.61 The same threat of governmental power that man-
dates equal treatment of rich and poor in criminal cases should en-
title the indigent welfare recipient to at least one level of judicial re-
view of administrative action.
Aside from the criminal-civil distinction between Griffin and the
Boddie line of cases, an additional basis for the refusal to extend
Griffin to the civil area appears to be the Court's conclusion that wealth
is not a suspect classification.6 2 The Court expressly stated that neither
Kras nor Ortwein involved suspect classifications, and therefore applied
the rational justification test. 3 This rejection of the equal protection
argument reflects the Court's reluctance to use the equal protection
clause as a vehicle to extend broad rights of access to the courts, even
where the litigation involves governmental action that has resulted
in the loss of an individual's property interests.
58. 401 U.S. at 390-91 (Black, J., dissenting).
59. Id.
60. 351 U.S. at 17 (emphasis added).
61. In Boddie, the "dispute" was between two marriage partners; in Kras, between
debtor and creditor. In Ortwein, however, the "dispute" was between welfare recipient
and governmental agency-the very agency that denied petitioners relief. In this situa-
tion the government and the individual are adverse parties and the loss of a valuable
property interest is at stake. Thus, it would seem that the individual should be entitled
to the safeguards of a judicial determination in order to protect him from the "great
governmental power" of which Justice Black spoke in his dissent in Boddie. 401 U.S. at
390.
62. In San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973), the Court
rejected the notion that wealth per se is a suspect classification, stating that "this Court
has never heretofore held that wealth discrimination alone provides an adequate basis
for invoking close scrutiny .... Id. at 29.
Prior to that decision the Court had suggested that wealth classifications were sus-
pect. See, e.g., McDonald v. Board of Election Comm'rs, 394 U.S. 802, 807 (1969); Harper
v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966). The result of the Court's failure to
find a suspect classification in Rodriguez was that the rational basis test rather than the
more stringent compelling state interest test was applied.
63. See Ortwein v. Schwab, 410 US. at 660; United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. at 446.
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Both Kras and Ortwein emphasize the Court's final comment in
Boddie-that in deciding Boddie the Court was going "no further than
necessary to dispose of the case before" it, and that it was not deciding
"that access for all individuals to the courts is a right that is, in all
circumstances, guaranteed by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. " 64 Although the Kras-Ortwein Court has demonstrated
that Boddie is to be given a very narrow and restricted application,
the right of free access to the courts should not be considered fore-
closed.6 5 A person asserting a constitutional right to proceed in forma
pauperis under Boddie, however, has a heavy burden of establishing
the existence of both a fundamental interest and state monopolization.
Many future cases may involve such an interest, but the strict monopoli-
zation requirement stands as a barrier to the expanded recognition of
free access to the courts.
Class Actions-FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE-RuLE 23(b)(3)
CLASS ACTION REQUIRES PERSONAL NOTICE TO ALL IDENTIFIABLE
MEMBERS OF THE CLASS.-Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 479 F.2d 1005
(2d Cir. 1973), aff'd 42 U.S.L.W. 4804 (U.S. May 28, 1974).
In 1966 Morton Eisen brought an antitrust treble damage suit
in federal district court1 on behalf of himself and all others who had
purchased or sold stock in odd-lots2 on the New York Stock Exchange
64. 401 U.S. at 382.
65. It has been suggested that actions for paternity, custody and adoption of
children, as well as actions for annulment or legal separation of marriage, may involve
both elements of the Boddie two-prong test. Comment, The Heirs of Boddie: Court
Access for Indigents After Kras and Ortwein, 8 HARv. Civ. RIGHTs-CIV. LiB. L. Rxv. 671,
575-76 (1973). See also Grissom v. Dade, No. 44,178 (Fla. March 27, 1974) (state law re-
quiring adopting party to pay costs of notice by publication in adoption proceeding
constitutes denial of equal protection and due process as applied to indigents).
1. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 41 F.R.D. 147 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
2. The district court described odd-lot trading as follows:
[T]he normal trading units on the stock exchanges are in multiples of 100 shares,
sometimes called 'round-lots'. Odd-lots, thus, are units of stock less than 100, the
established unit of trading. For odd-lot transactions, in addition to the normal
brokerage commission, an additional fee known as the 'odd-lot differential' is
charged. At the time this suit was commenced, the differential was 1/8 point
(12 1/2 cents) per share when the price per share was 39 7/8 or below and 1/4
point (25 cents) per share when the price was 40 or above. Effective July 1, 1966.
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